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Abstract
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading can facilitate integration of a large number of small-scale producers and
consumers into energy markets. Decentralized management of these new market participants is challenging
in terms of market settlement, participant reputation and consideration of grid constraints. This paper
proposes a blockchain-enabled framework for P2P energy trading among producer and consumer agents
in a smart grid. A fully decentralized market settlement mechanism is designed, which does not rely on
a centralized entity to settle the market and encourages producers and consumers to negotiate on energy
trading with their nearby agents truthfully. To this end, the electrical distance of agents is considered in
the pricing mechanism to encourage agents to trade with their neighboring agents. In addition, a reputation
factor is considered for each agent, reflecting its past performance in delivering the committed energy. Before
starting the negotiation, agents select their trading partners based on their preferences over the reputation
and proximity of the trading partners. An Anonymous Proof of Location (A-PoL) algorithm is proposed that
allows agents to prove their location without revealing their real identity. The practicality of the proposed
framework is illustrated through several case studies, and its security and privacy are analyzed in detail.
Keywords: Distributed energy resource (DER), Blockchain, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) trading, transactive
energy (TE), smart grid, Internet of Things (IoT).
1. Introduction
In response to climate change concerns, the decarbonization and digitization of the electricity sector have
been accelerated in recent years. The path toward decarbonization is associated with the high penetration
of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs), such as rooftop solar, home batteries, and Electric Vehicles (EVs)
with the potential to support a reliable, affordable and lower-emissions electricity grid. Progressive deploy-
ment of DERs raises several opportunities and challenges in the electricity systems [1]. Technical challenges
include the increase in bidirectional power flows, the raise in the voltage levels, and lack of visibility [2].
On the other side, efficient DER integration can provide substantial benefits for energy customers [3]. DER
owners can benefit from Feed-In-Tariffs (FiTs) programs by selling energy back to the utility grid for a fixed
price [4]. Alternatively, they can be coordinated and orchestrated for participation in different markets.
Given this context, Transactive Energy (TE) is emerging as a new approach for orchestrating and co-
ordinating operation of DERs. TE is a market-based approach for energy management, which uses price
signals to coordinate demand and supply across the network and among all users and entities [5]. TE ap-
proach facilitates integration of DERs in the grid, while maintaining the system reliability [6]. It provides a
transformative solution to technological and socioeconomic challenges of the power grid modernization [7].
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Built upon the context of TE, a novel technique for the integration of small-scale producers and consumers
to energy markets is Peer-to-Peer (P2P) trading, which allows bilateral energy transactions between users
[8]. P2P trading provides significant benefits for both end users and grid operators such as increasing welfare
by preference satisfaction [9], lowering operational costs, and improving system reliability [10]. P2P trading
offers the flexibility required to coordinate agents with diverse preferences. Recent advances in the Internet
of Things (IoT) and digital technologies have paved the path toward grid digitization. Grid digitization
provides a two-way communication network that allows DER owners and energy consumers to act as proac-
tive agents in the energy markets and facilitates P2P market implementation. Through direct interaction
of agents in a decentralized platform, small-scale producers are allowed to compete with large traditional
suppliers, and consumers have the freedom to select their energy suppliers based on their preferences.
In the P2P trading, it is expected that market participants can settle the bilateral transactions with
least influence from a central authority [11]. Hence, designing a decentralized platform for managing market
participants with diverse preferences is a challenging task. Blockchain technology offers new opportunities
for decentralized market designs due to its salient features which includes decentralization, trust, anonymity,
and auditability. Blokchain enables energy producers and consumers to directly negotiate and trade energy
without reliance on Trusted Third Party (TTP). It provides a platform to store and share data in a secure
and verifiable manner, even when the identity and trustworthiness of market participants are unknown [12].
The participating nodes in the blockchain, that includes energy consumers, producers, prosumers, or grid
2
operators, jointly form an overlay network where they can exchange information [13]. Given the properties
of blockchain, and the need for a truly decentralized platform for P2P trading, designing blockchain-enabled
frameworks for P2P trading is gaining momentum in recent years.
The blockchain framework for P2P trading should incorporate an appropriate market settlement approach
to match trading peers and to settle the bilateral transactions among them. Compared to traditional markets,
P2P market offers more flexibility and trading options to the agents, and hence, it needs a pricing mechanism
that incentivizes both producers and consumers to participate in the market. There are several approaches
that can be applied to P2P market clearing and peer matching, such as auction-based mechanism, game
theory, and optimization-based methods [14, 15, 16]. In the auction-based mechanism, agents express their
interest in energy trading by submitting their offers, and the energy allocation and price would be determined
based on the market clearing rules [14]. The game theory approaches aim to provide a stable solution that
is beneficial for all parties [15]. In the optimization-based methods, the market settlement is formulated as
an optimization problem, which can be decomposed to local subproblems solvable by each agent [16]. The
optimization-based methods can be implemented in a decentralized manner without any need for third party
interventions, which allows agents to optimize their welfare by participating in the P2P market. Hence, these
methods are well-suited for blockchain-enabled P2P markets. However, the computation and communication
overheads of these methods are of concern, as they require agents to iteratively negotiate to reach agreements
on their actions. Therefore, reducing these overheads is a key requirement
This paper designs a blockchain-enabled P2P market that provides a secure and transparent environment
for the energy trading of producer and consumer agents. In the proposed approach, agents Advertise their
surplus/deficit energy during each market interval. We use an Advertisement Database (AD) that is centrally
managed by the grid operator to skip storing advertisement in public blockchain, which in turn, reduces
the blockchain memory footprint. A decentralized optimization algorithm is employed for the Negotiation
that allows agents to iteratively optimize their welfare in the negotiation process. In order to reduce the
computation and communication overheads, a Prioritization step is considered in the market settlement
process that enables agents to prioritize their trading partners based on their proximity and reputation factor.
Network constraints should be incorporated in the P2P trading to ensure that energy transactions respect
electric grid constraints. Instead of enforcing network constraints directly to the proposed framework, we
define a grid service charge for each transaction. To incentivize agents to trade energy with their neighboring
agents and reducing network loading, this charge is calculated based on the electrical distance between
producer and consumer. To this end, we propose an Anonymous Proof of Location (A-PoL) algorithm that
enables agents to prove their location without revealing their real identity. Once the energy consumer and
producer agree on the conditions of the trade, they start trading the energy. To reduce the reliance on
TTP yet ensure the security of the trade, we adopt the concept of atomic meta-transactions [17] where
two transactions are considered valid only if they are generated within a particular period of time. The
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
- a decentralized P2P trading framework that does not require access to private information of agents
in any stage of the market settlement;
- a novel prioritization step to allow agents to select their trading partners based on their location and
reputation in order to reduce the system overheads;
- a new A-PoL algorithm, which uses a Certificate of Location (CoL) issued by smart meters to approve
the location of agents without revealing their real identity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains some related work. Section 3 outlines
the structure of the market, including agents modeling, market objective, and decentralized optimization
of the market objective. Section 4 explains the market settlement process and its different steps. Case
studies and numerical results are reported in Section 5. A detailed analysis of the security and privacy of
the proposed framework is presented in Section 6. Finally, concluding remarks are given in Section 7.
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2. Prior Art
In recent years blockchain applications in energy systems, such as demand response, microgrid energy
management, EV integration, and energy trading, has attracted tremendous attention due to its salient
features including decentralization, transparency, trust, and immutability [18, 19]. In [20], a decentralized
framework for cooperative demand response is presented, in which smart contracts are employed to allow
participants to collaboratively decide on their planning profiles. Su et. al [21] employed blockchain to
implement secure charging services for EVs with the execution of smart contracts. In [22], blockchain
technology is utilized to implement a demand side energy management method for the efficient operation
of microgrids. Hassan et. al [23] developed a blockchain-based approach for microgrid energy auction, in
which to reduce computational complexity, at every node consortium blockchain is used that authorizes only
selected nodes to add a new block in the blockchain.
The application of blockchain for P2P energy trading has been investigated in several studies. The
Brooklyn microgrid is a prototype of a blockchain-enabled P2P market, in which a blockchain framework
is employed to implement a decentralized microgrid energy market [10]. A unified blockchain framework
for various scenarios of energy trading in an industrial IoT is proposed in [24], in which a credit-based
payment scheme is employed to overcome the transaction limitation caused by transaction confirmation
delays. An operation framework for P2P energy trading at the distribution level is presented in [25], where
the system operator clears the market using a crowdsourced energy system model. Dang et. al [26] proposed
a blockchain-based P2P market for optimal load management of big industrial users, in which users can
organize their own P2P market to save their electricity costs. In [27], a two-layer system for distributed
electricity trading among prosumers is proposed, in which in the first layer prosumers can form coalitions
and negotiate energy trading, and in the second layer blockchain is employed for settlement of transactions
formed in the first layer. A methodology for the co-simulation of power distribution networks and local P2P
energy trading platforms is presented in [28], in which a blockchain-based distributed double auction trade
mechanism is employed to model the trading platform.
The existing blockchain-based frameworks for energy trading suffer from: (i) negotiation overheads: the
decentralized optimization methods rely on iterative negotiation between involved agents. In a market
with large number of participants, this iterative process increases the communication and computation
overheads, and consequently the negotiation time. (ii) Reliance on a TTP: most of the existing studies
rely on a TTP to oversee the trade and ensure that both sides of the trade commit to their obligations.
However, this potentially may lead to centralization and privacy concerns as TTP can build virtual profile
about the users. (iii) Blockchain overheads: in conventional blockchain-based methods in smart grids, all
communications are stored in the blockchain, which in turn increases the blockchain memory footprint and
thus reduces scalability. In this regard, this paper proposes a blockchain-enabled P2P market that alleviates
the above-mentioned limitations.
3. The Market Structure
In this section, we outline the details of the market structure. As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed
architecture consists of two layers: i) physical layer that is the underlying physical network to transfer
electricity from producers to consumers. The minimum requirement for a successful transaction between a
producer and a consumer is the existence of a path to transfer power between them, and ii) information
layer where the participating nodes, that includes energy producer, consumer, and the grid operator, connect
through a public blockchain to share information. The information layer provides a secure platform for the
participating nodes to advertise their energy, negotiate on their offers, and decide on their actions in the
market. The market mechanism is implemented in this layer that enables the agents to trade energy and
settle energy transactions.
3.1. Agents modeling
We consider an energy network with a set of agents consisting of a set of producer agents with index
i ∈ P = {1, ..., P} and a set of consumer agents with index j ∈ C = {1, ..., C} connected to a physical
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Figure 1: An overview of the proposed blockchain-enabled P2P energy trading.
layer manged by a grid operator. Producers have energy producing capability and can use their own
generated energy for their demand. In case there is more generation than demand, producers can sell
surplus energy to consumers or to the grid. Consumers, on the other side, can buy energy from producers
or the grid. Producers and consumers can negotiate for energy trading in a forward market for any time
interval t ∈ T = {1, ..., T} with equal duration (e.g., one hour). Agents are equipped with smart meters,
which determines the energy surplus/deficit for trade in each time slot. The smart meters are connected to
the information layer and thus, can exchange information in blockchain. It is assumed that the smart meters
are tamper-resistant. We assume that each agent is equipped with an energy management system that can
quantitatively estimate the energy surplus or deficit that needs to be traded in each market interval. Each
agent can trade with the grid or with other agents in the network. The total energy surplus and deficit of
producers and consumers is represented as
ei = e
G
i +
∑
j∈C
ePij (1)
ej = e
G
j +
∑
i∈P
ePji (2)
where, eGi and e
G
j are the traded energy between producer i/consumer j and the grid respectively, e
P
ij is the
sold energy by producer i to consumer j, and ePji is the purchased energy by consumer j from producer i.
Each agent in the P2P market aims to maximize its welfare. The welfare incorporates the utility/cost of
energy consumption/generation, cost/revenue of trade with other agents or the grid, and the cost of using
grid for the P2P trading. The welfare function of producers and consumers can be modeled by (3) and (4),
respectively
Wi(ei, λij , γij) = λ
GeGi +
∑
j∈C
ePij(λij − γij)− Ci(ei) (3)
Wj(ej , λij , γij) = Uj(ej)− λGeGj −
∑
i∈P
ePij(λij + γij) (4)
where λG denotes FiT representing the price for selling energy to the grid; λij is energy price in transaction
between producer i and consumer j; γij is grid service charge for using grid infrastructure for this trade;
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λ
G
denotes the price for selling from the grid which is usually a fixed value over the time (e.g. time of use
tariff). The grid selling and buying prices limit energy price in the P2P market, i.e. for any bilateral trade
λG ≤ λij ≤ λG. (5)
The cost function of the producer represents the cost of generating energy ei and can be modeled as [29]
Ci(ei) = aie
2
i + biei + ci (6)
where ai, bi and ci are positive constants, which can be adjusted by the producer to reflect the generation
cost. Since producers usually have renewable generation resources with zero marginal costs, the cost function
can represent the cost associated with battery degradation cost, if the producer needs to discharge its battery
to sell the energy. On the other side, the utility function of a consumer represents its satisfaction level by
consuming energy ej and can be modeled as [30]
Uj(ej) =
{−aje2j + bjej : 0 ≤ ej ≤ bj2aj
b2j
4aj
: ej ≥ bj2aj
(7)
where aj , and bj are unique positive constants for each consumer. These parameters reflect the valuation
of the energy by the consumer and denotes the price that consumer is willing to pay for the energy. A
fundamental challenge in implementing P2P markets is how to deal with network constraints, without
having a central dispatch mechanism. In this work, instead of enforcing network constraints directly, we
use a grid service charge for each trade [31]. This fee represents the price that agents need to pay for using
the grid infrastructure for each trade. To incite agents to trade with their closest electrical partner and
to reduce network loading, this charge is calculated based on the electrical distance between producer and
consumer as in
γij = ωdij (8)
where ω is the grid service charge per unit of electrical distance for each unit of energy, and dij is the electrical
distance between producer i and consumer j. This distance can be calculated based on power transfer
distance, which aggregates the absolute value of Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) induced by a
trade as in
dij =
∑
l∈L
φlij . (9)
For any trade, φlij indicates the fraction of transacted power from producer i to consumer j that flows over
a line l, and can be calculated using the method presented in [32].
3.2. Market objective
The market objective for P2P trading is formulated as social welfare maximization, which maximizes the
total welfare of players in the market subject to the constraints, and mathematically can be modeled as:
max
ei,ej
∑
i∈P
Wi +
∑
j∈C
Wj
s.t. constraints.
(10)
As stated in (5), the prices in the P2P market should always be beneficial for both producers and consumers.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that all agents try to maximize their traded energy in the P2P market
and to minimize trading with the grid by setting eGi = e
G
j = 0. Therefore, (10) can be rewritten as:
max
eij ,eji
∑
j∈C
Uj(eji)−
∑
i∈P
Ci(eij)−
∑
j∈C
∑
i∈P
(eij + eji)γij (11a)
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s.t. ei ≤
∑
j∈C
ePij ≤ ei : µi, µi (11b)
ej ≤
∑
i∈P
ePji ≤ ej : µj , µj (11c)
ePij = e
P
ji : λij (11d)
where (11b) and (11c) represents the flexibility constraints of producer, and consumer, respectively. The con-
straint (11d) represents the power balance in transaction between producer i and consumer j. µi, µi, µj , µj , λij
are dual variables associated with these constraints.
3.3. Decentralized optimization
In this paper, our aim is to solve (11) with only P2P communications to ensure data privacy of the
agents. To do so, a decentralized optimization approach is employed to formulate the market settlement in
P2P market [16]. In this approach, dual variables are used to decouple constraints, and then, the problem
is decomposed to local subproblems solvable by producers and consumers. The local subproblem is solved
by deploying the sub-gradient projection method [33]. Each agent contributes to solving the global problem
by updating its local decision variables. The set of decision variables for producers and consumers are
{λij , ePij , µi, µi}, and {ePji, µj , µj}, respectively. The market settlement approach is an iterative process, in
which agents update their decision variables iteratively and exchange information without revealing their
private information. The updates of the decision variables of agents are based on the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
(KKT) optimality conditions of the local problems, and can be developed using first order deviate of the
relaxed problem as follows:
∀i ∈ P
λk+1ij =
[
λkij − ρkλ(eP,kij − eP,kji )
]+
(12a)
µi
k+1 =
[
µi
k + ρkµ(ei − eki )
]+
(12b)
µi
k+1 =
[
µi
k + ρkµ(e
k
i − ei)
]+
(12c)
eP,k+1ij =
[
eP,kij + ζ
k
ij(e˜
P,k+1
ij − eki )
]+
(12d)
e˜P,k+1ij =
λk+1ij − γij − µik+1 + µik+1 − bi
2ai
(12e)
∀j ∈ C
µj
k+1 =
[
µj
k + ρkµ(ej − ekj )
]+
(13a)
µj
k+1 =
[
µj
k + ρkµ(e
k
j − ej)
]+
(13b)
eP,k+1ji =
[
eP,kji + ζ
k
ji(e˜
P,k+1
ji − ekj )
]+
(13c)
e˜P,k+1ji =
bj − λk+1ij − γij − µjk+1 + µjk+1
2aj
(13d)
where k is the iteration index, e˜Pij , e˜
P
ji are optimal power set points of producer and consumer at the price
λij . ζij , ζji are asymptotically proportional factors, ρ is a small tuning parameter, and [.]
+ denotes max
{.,0}. The information exchange between producers and consumers during the decentralized optimization
process is explained in Section 4.4.
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Figure 2: Market settlement algorithm.
4. Market Settlement Process
In this section, we outline the details of the market settlement process for P2P trading. The proposed
framework consists of four main phases namely; (i) Advertisement: to enable agents to advertise the energy
that they want to trade, (ii) Prioritization: to allow agent prioritize their trading partners based on their
preferences, (iii) Negotiation: in which agents negotiate on the energy quantity and price in each transaction,
and (iv) Energy trading: which is the step that energy transfer and payment would be taking place. These
steps are summarized in Fig. 2 and discussed in detail in the rest of this section.
4.1. Anonymous proof of location
As shown in (8) in the proposed framework the grid service charge is calculated based on the location
of the participants denoted by σ which requires the involved parties to reveal their location. However, this
potentially enables the malicious nodes to track the activities of a particular user, which in turn compromises
user privacy. Additionally, the distributed and anonymous nature of blockchain makes it challenging for the
users to verify the location claimed by another node. To address these challenges, we propose an A-PoL
algorithm that enables the users to prove their location while protecting their real identity, which in turn
enhances the level of anonymity offered to the users.
The proposed A-PoL algorithm involves a CoL that is issued by a smart meter in the network, as shown
in Fig. 3. The energy companies maintain a local record of the accurate location of the installed smart
meters. During the installation process, the energy company deploys a key pair in each smart meter (step
1 in Fig. 3) and records < PK, location > tuple in its local storage. The company serves as a certificate
authority (CA) for PKs deployed in smart meters. Although the CA is a trusted authority, relying on
the PK provided by the CA may compromise the privacy of the users as the company can build a virtual
profile of the user and their energy trading (by observing the proof of location transactions). To address
this challenge, we propose CoL.
CoL is a certificate received from a verifier that is an independent smart meter in the network. Assume
smart meter A is going to establish a CoL. Once deployed on site, A explores the CA to find potential smart
meters that can function as the verifier and selects one randomly. Assume smart meter B is selected by A
to function as the verifier. Recall that we assume the smart meters are tamper resistant, and thus A can
send its request to any meter listed in CA. A sends a CoL request transaction to B that is structured as
< T ID,MTR, σ, PK, Sign >, where T ID is the unique identifier of the transaction which essentially is
the hash of the transaction content.
A populates the root hash of a Merkle tree constructed by recursively hashing a number of PKs in the
MTR field. The PKs in the leaves of the tree are later employed by A to prove ownership on the CoL, which
is discussed in greater detail later in this section. The number of PKs may vary based on the application.
σ is the noisy location of the smart meter that can be the location at a lower resolution, e.g., the street
in which the meter is installed. This protects the privacy of the smart meter against deanonymization, as
studied later in Section 6. PK is the PK of A allocated by the CA, and Sign is the corresponding signature,
which proves that A owns the private key corresponding to the PK.
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When the verifier, i.e. B receives the CoL request, it verifies that the transaction is generated by a
genuine smart meter that is done by requesting the CA (step 3). To protect the privacy of the user, the CA
does not reveal the actual location of the smart meter to B instead, only confirms if the PK is registered
and genuine smart meter. Once verified, the verifier creates a CoL that is sign(hash(MTR, σ)) and replies
back to A by sending the reply transaction structured as < CoL, PK, Sign >, where CoL is as outlined
above, PK is the PK of the verifier, i.e., B registered by the CA, and Sign is the corresponding signature
of the verifier.
A employs the received CoL to anonymously prove its location to the nodes in the overlay. To do so, A
appends CoLAf = (CoLA, PKver, Sigver,MTRA, σA, PKA,MTLA, SignA) where the first three fields are
extracted from the response of the verifier B. MTR and σA are extracted from the CoL request sent to the
verifier. PKA is a PK that was part of the leaves of the Merkle tree. MTLA is the leaves of the Merkle tree
that are necessary to prove the existence of PKA in the MTR, and SignA is the signature corresponding
to PK. The last three fields ensure that only the owner of the certificate, who knows the PKs in the Merkle
tree and the corresponding private key, can use the certificate.
To verify the location of A, the participating nodes in the blockchain, say C, must first verify that PKA
belongs to MTRR using MTLA. Next, C verifies if SignA matches PKA. The third step in verifying is to
verify if hash(MTRA, σA) = CoLA. The final step is for C to verify PKver using CA. This ensures that
a genuine smart meter has signed the CoL. If all the above steps successfully passed, the location of A is
verified.
Having discussed the details of the proposed A-PoL algorithm, we study the process of P2P energy
trading in the rest of this section. The algorithms implemented by producer and consumer agents are
represented in Algorithm 1 and 2, respectively, and are discussed with greater details in the rest of this
section.
4.2. Advertisement
The main aim of this phase is for the agents to advertise their energy to the potential consumers/producers.
In each market interval, agents participate in the forward market by submitting their offers and asks in the
form of advertisement transaction (AT) that is structured as follow AT = (T ID, price/amount, ηi, CoL
i
f ),
where price/amount can be either the price of the energy, i.e., λi,∀i ∈ P, if AT is generated by a producer
or the amount of requested energy, i.e., ej ,∀j ∈ C, if AT is generated by a consumer, and η is the reputation
factor of agent.
In conventional blockchain-based frameworks, the negotiation transactions are stored in the blockchain
that provides high auditability. However, this increases the computational and storage resource consumption
of the blockchain and limits the throughput, i.e., the total number of transactions that can be stored per
second [34]. These can limit the blockchain scalability while smart grid comprises of a broad range of
devices that may produce transactions frequently. To address this challenge, in the proposed framework,
the negotiation transactions are stored in a public database managed by the grid operator that is referred to
as Advertisement Database (AD). The write access of AD is restricted only to the grid operator and other
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Algorithm 1 Producer’s Algorithm
1: Submit offer AT . Advertisement
2: Explore AD to find potential trading partners
3: Divide consumers in groups Ω1i , ...,Ω
N
i using (16) . Prioritization
4: Set n← 1
5: Receive EN transactions from consumers . Negotiation
6: while |λP,k+1ij − λP,kij |≥  do
7: for j ∈ Ωi do
8: Receive γij from grid operator
9: Receive ekji from consumer
10: Calculate λk+1ij using (12a)
11: Update µk+1i and µ
k+1
i
using (12b) and (12c)
12: Calculate eP,k+1ij using (12d)
13: Broadcast λP,k+1ij to consumers
14: end for
15: end while
16: Check if more energy is available
17: Set n← n+ 1
18: Repeat Negotiation with new consumers
19: Receive LP from consumers . Energy trading
20: Inject agreed energy
21: Sign EI
nodes in the overlay have read-only permission. The parties involved in an AT transaction, i.e., energy
producers and consumers, may store the transactions locally to be employed as a reference in case of a
dispute between parties. The final price and the amount of energy agreed by the participants are later
defined during a negotiation which limits future references to AT transaction. Thus, we store AT in AD
which potentially reduces the packet overhead and blockchain memory footprint.
4.3. Prioritization
After advertisement step, agents explore the available ATs in the AD for the negotiation. One-on-one
negotiation can increase the delay associated with finalizing the trade as either side of the trade may have
higher welfare in trading with another party in the network. Also, negotiation with every agent in the
market increases the computation and communication overheads, which potentially leads to low scalability
[35]. Thus, agents need to prioritize their trading partners based on their preferences and only negotiate
with a given number of agents.
As stated in Section 3.1, agents have to pay a grid service charge for each transaction as defined in (8).
This charge is directly associated with the distance between the producer i and the consumer j, and impacts
the welfare of the agents. Accordingly, agents are incentivized to trade with trading partners located in close
vicinity. This reduces the load on the transmission lines and thus reduces the cost in managing the physical
layer. On the other hand, agents may prefer to negotiate with the trading partners with higher reputation
factors, indicating their past performance in fulfilling their commitments. Thus, agents need to prioritize
their trading partners based on their preferences to limit the partner search space. These preferences include
reputation factor and distance. Agents may have varied preferences over reputation factor and distance of
their trading partners. Hence, we define a priority index for each possible transaction between producers
and consumers. This index for offer from consumer j received by producer i, and offer from producer i
received by consumer j are defined using (14) and (15), respectively.
Υij = αiρj + βi(1−
|σi − σj |
Dij
) (14)
Υji = αjρi + βj(1−
|σi − σj |
Dji
) (15)
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Algorithm 2 Consumer’s Algorithm
1: Submit ask AT . Advertisement
2: Explore AD to find potential trading partners
3: Divide producers in groups Ω1j , ...,Ω
N
j using (17) . Prioritization
4: Set n← 1
5: Send EN transactions to producers . Negotiation
6: while |eP,k+1j − eP,kj |≥  do
7: for i ∈ Ωnj do
8: Receive γij from grid operator
9: Receive λkij from producer
10: Update µk+1j and µ
k+1
j
using (13a) and (13b)
11: Calculate eP,k+1ji using (13c)
12: Broadcast eP,k+1ji to producers
13: end for
14: end while
15: Check if more energy is needed
16: Set n← n+ 1
17: Repeat Negotiation with new producers
18: Send LP to producers . Energy trading
19: Sign EI
where α and β are the weights that agent places on the reputation factor and proximity of other agents,
respectively such that α + β = 1, Dij = max
σj
|σi − σj |, Dji = max
σi
|σi − σj |. The second term in (14) and
(15) denotes the proximity of each trading partner to the agent, such that for the furthest trading partner
of each agent this value is zero. After calculating priority index, each agent divides its trading partners to a
set of N groups and then, starts to negotiate with the agents from the group with the highest priority and
proceed to the group with the lowest priority. Each group of potential consumers/producers for producer
i/consumer j can be formed as
Ωni = {j ∈ C|(N − n)/N ≤ Υij ≤ (N − n+ 1)/N},∀n ∈ N (16)
Ωnj = {i ∈ P|(N − n)/N ≤ Υji ≤ (N − n+ 1)/N},∀n ∈ N (17)
in which for consumer j, producers in group Ωnj have higher priority than producers in Ω
n+1
j . Similarly, for
producer i, consumers in group Ωni have higher priority than consumers in Ω
n+1
i .
4.4. Negotiation
After prioritization, each consumer starts negotiating with producer agents in Ω1j . The first step is for
consumer A to request the grid service charge from the grid operator. A sends the list of agents in Ω1j to
the grid operator who calculates grid service charges using (8) and sends the response back to A. Once A
receives the grid service charge, it starts the negotiation with agents in Ω1j by sending an Energy Negotiation
(EN) transaction that is structured as < T ID,Amount, Price, PKD, SignD, PK+, Sign, PK+,
AgreementP , AgreementC > where Amount identifies the total amount of energy demanded by A and price
is the price in which the consumer is willing to pay. PKD and SignD represent PK of the destination
agent and its corresponding signature. The destination can be either the producer, when A generates the
transaction, or A, when a producer is the generator of the transaction. This potentially enables routing the
transaction to the destination using the routing algorithm proposed in [17]. Sign and PK represent the PK
and signature of the transaction generator. Finally, AgreementP and AgreementC are flags that indicate
whether the energy producer or consumer, respectively, agree with all situations in the trade. The generator
of EN signs the hash of the transaction content which potentially ensures the integrity of the transaction
content. After populating EN, A sends the transaction to the energy producers in Ω1j .
The energy producer may receive several EN transactions from consumers. The producer only responds
to those who are in the set of Ω1i . For each received EN from consumers in this set, the producer updates
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the price using (12a). When the response from the producer is received by the consumers, they update
their energy using (13c) and again respond to the producer. This process continues till both sides of the
trade agree on the trade conditions and thus set AgreementP and AgreementC as ’1’. An EN transaction
is considered as a valid transaction to be stored in the blockchain only when both energy producer and
consumer sign the transaction and AgreementP and AgreementC are set as ’1’. This ensures that only the
last transaction that contains the trade conditions is stored in the blockchain, which in turn increases the
blockchain throughput and reduces the delay of the negotiation.
4.5. Energy trading
In this section, we discuss the energy trading process. Once agents agree on the trade condition, during
the negotiation step, the consumer generates a Late Payment (LP) transaction that pays the energy price
to the producer. Conventional energy trading frameworks rely on a TTP to oversee the trade and ensure
that both sides of the trade commit to their obligations, which in turn reduces the privacy of the users. To
address this challenge, our framework relies on atomic meta-transactions. In the latter, two transactions are
considered valid if and only if both are generated within a specified time frame. Any incompatible transaction
is considered as invalid and thus is not stored in the blockchain [17]. LP is an atomic meta-transactions thus
the energy price is not transferred to the producer accoutn unless LP is coupled with another transaction that
is discussed in next paragraph. LP is structured as < T ID,Price, Input,Output, EN Ref,Expiry T ime,
Sign >, where price is price to be paid to the energy producer. Input is the address of an unspent transaction
that has enough balance to pay the transaction price, and output is the address of the energy producer as in
the last EN transaction. En Ref is the address of the EN transaction that is stored in the public blockchain.
Expiry Time represents the time period in which the second transaction corresponding to the current LP
must be generated, otherwise, LP is discarded. Sign is the signature of the transaction generator that must
be corresponding to the PK used in EN transaction. The consumer then broadcasts LP transaction.
The energy producer starts injecting energy to the grid when it receives the LP transaction. Once the to-
tal amount of agreed energy is injected to the grid, the smart meter of the producer generates an Energy Injec-
tion (EI) transaction which is a multisig transaction and is structured as < Amount, LP ID,PK P, Sign P,
PK C, Sign C >, where Amount is the amount of energy injected into the grid by the producer. LP ID is
T ID of the corresponding LP that is used for verification of the trade as outlined in the next paragraph.
EI requires two out of two signatures to be considered as a valid transaction that are the energy producer
signature, populated in PK P and Sign P, and energy consumer signature, populated in PK C and Sign C.
Once EI is broadcasted to the network, the participating nodes in the blockchain start verifying the
energy trade. First, the participants must locate the associated LP and EN. Recall that EI contains the
LP ID and LP contains EN Ref that is the identifier of the EN transaction. The verifiers first match the
signatures and PKs in the transactions. The next step is for the verifiers to validate that the amount and
price agreed in the transactions match. Once all the above steps are successfully validated, EI and LP
transactions are stored in the blockchain, which triggers the payment of the energy price to the energy
producer. If the price in these transactions differs, the verifiers discard those transactions.
In case of detecting inconsistency in the amount of the injected energy in EI, the verifiers call a Dispute
Resolution (DR) smart contract. The DR smart contract contains rules to manage the situation where
the energy producer failed to transfer the promised amount of energy to the consumer, for example, the
energy produced by the solar panel of an energy producer may be less than the estimated production,
which potentially impacts the traded energy. Based on the amount of transferred energy identified in EI,
DR calculates a new energy price and generates a Price Update (PU) transaction requesting the energy
consumer to generate a new LP with exactly the same condition as the previous one while updating the
price. PU is structured as < LP ID,Old Price,New Price >. The new LP is broadcast to the network
and is stored in the blockchain with the corresponding EI.
Recall that in the proposed framework, we defined the reputation factor that impacts the decision making
of the nodes. The reputation is given by the DR smart contract based on the commitments of an energy
producer. In the case of the above example, the DR will reduce the reputation of the node and inform all
participants. In this study, we consider the negative reputation only, which is when a node misbehaved in
the network.
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Figure 4: 33-Bus test system.
Table 1: Parameter Setup.
Key parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
P 14 C 18
ρλ 0.01 ρµ 0.001
λ
G
5 ¢/kWhˆ2 λG 25 ¢/kWhˆ2
N 2 ω 2 ¢/kWh/ km
Producers’ parameters Consumers’ parameters
ai (0.5-1] ¢/kWhˆ2 aj (0.5-10] ¢/kWhˆ2
bi [5-10] ¢/kWh bj [10-20] ¢/kWh
ei [0-5] kWh ej [1-4] kWh
ei [5-10] kWh ej [6-10] kWh
ηi, αi, βi [0-1] ηj , αj , βj [0-1]
5. Case Studies
In this section, simulation case studies are provided to verify the operation of the proposed framework.
As shown in Fig. 4, the considered test system is the IEEE 33-bus distribution system with 16 producers
and 16 consumers. Table 1 summarizes key parameters and range of values for producers and consumers
parameters.
Fig. 5 illustrates the results of P2P trading in the test system. The traded energy and price in different
transactions have various values based on the agents’ preferences. Agents tend to trade energy with their
closest neighbor agents to pay less grid service charge. For example, consumer at bus 1 buys energy from
producer at bus 18. However, if the offer/ask from the agent at the nearest node is not available, or does
not satisfy the requirement of the agents, they have to trade with other neighboring agents. For instance,
while the nearest agents to agent 5 are agents at bus 4 and 6, this agent trades energy with producers at
bus 26 and 27. Since agents 4 and 6 have preferred to trade with other neighboring nodes (agents at bus 3
and 7 respectively), their offers are not available to the agent 5. It can be seen that agents 16 and 17 do
not buy any energy in the market. These agents have lower utility function parameters compared to their
neighboring agents, which means that their willingness to pay for energy is less than agent 15, and hence,
producer at bus 14 prefers to trade with the agent at bus 15.
To investigate the impact of considering the grid service charge on the number of transactions (nT ), we
implemented the energy trading algorithm for different values of ω. The results are reported in Fig. 6,
where each marker indicates a transaction between the producer and consumer, and the total number of
transactions in each case is given in parentheses. The case with ω = 0 means that there is no limit on the
distance of agents, and they can trade with any number of agents. Therefore, the number of transactions in
this case is significantly higher. Increasing the value of ω reduces the number of transactions. The welfare
of agents depend on the grid service charge that they pay (see (3) and (4)), and hence, increase in ω reduces
their welfare as they have to trade less energy and pay more cost for utilizing the grid.
The negotiation among agents is an iterative process and the time required for agents to reach agreement
depends on several factors including, number of agents, number of iterations required for convergence in
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Figure 5: Transactions between producers and consumers; a) traded energy, b) energy price.
Table 2: Impact of Prioritization.
w prioritization w/o prioritization
No. of decision variables
38, 16 20, 6
(producer, consumer)
No. of communications
63 252
(in each iteration)
No. of iterations for convergence 163 206
Negotiation time (s) 1.04 1.88
Algorithm 1 and 2, the computation time required to solve (12) and (13) by agents in each iteration,
and communication time. The results of implementing the market settlement algorithm with and without
implementing prioritization step are compared, as reported in Table 2. The prioritization step reduces
the number of negotiating agents, and hence, reduces the number of communication in each iteration. On
the other hand, agents need less time to solve (12) and (13), as they have fewer decision variables after
prioritization. Therefore, applying prioritization reduces negotiation time among agents by nearly 45%.
In order to demonstrate the efficacy of the P2P market, the results of this market are compared with
the case that producers and consumers only trade with the grid. Comparative results are reported in Table
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Figure 6: Impact of considering grid service charge on the number of transactions.
Table 3: Comparative results of P2P market.
P2P No P2P
Total imported energy from grid (kWh) [
∑
j e
G
j ] 22.31 119
Total exported energy to grid (kWh) [
∑
i e
G
i ] 8.46 105
Total welfare of consumers (¢) [∑jWj ] 62.73 -4143.04
Total welfare of producers (¢) [∑iWi] 242.64 -302.03
Total paid grid service charge (¢) [∑j∑i epijγij ] 50.44 0
3. As it can be inferred from the results, P2P market reduces the imported and exported energy by agents
to the grid, meaning they trade more with other P2P agents. Also, since the P2P market price is more
beneficial for agents (see (5)), they can reach a higher value of welfare in the P2P market, though they have
to pay a grid service charge to the grid operator.
As stated in Section 4.2, in the proposed framework, the ATs are stored off chain in AD. Here, we study
the impact of using AD by evaluating the blockchain size and number of consensus rounds, i.e., evaluating
how many times the validators shall run the consensus algorithm. Blockchain size shows the amount of saved
storage space by employing AD while the number of consensus rounds evaluates the amount of computational
overhead saved by running less consensus rounds. We employed the structure and configuration of the IEEE
33-bus distribution to implement a distributed network using Java programming language on Raspberry
Pi 2. It is assumed that the size of each block is 10 transactions. The process involved in the consensus
algorithm is abstracted out as it does not impact the functionality of the proposed method. Ten market
intervals are implemented during which each energy producer generates an AT. To benchmark the results, a
baseline method is considered where all ATs are stored in the blockchain. To focus on the impact of AD, we
disregard the rest of the functions and assume ATs are the only transactions generated during each market
interval. Based on the implementation results, the size of each AT is 1776 B. After 10 epochs, the baseline
blockchain includes 16 blocks with the cumulative size of 314KB. Thus, each node must allocate 314KB
storage space to store blockchain. Our solution off-loads this overhead to a central trusted node who is
managing the AD, thus there is no memory overhead on the participating nodes in the blockchain. Assume
ν represents the overhead associated with appending a new block that includes computational, packet and
memory overhead. The proposed framework incurs no overhead during the advertisement process on the
validators while the overhead is 16ν in the conventional methods. We next evaluate the processing overhead
associated with CoL.
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Table 4: CoL processing time.
CoL formation CoL verification
Processing time (ms) 663.2 1795
Table 5: Comparison of transaction sizes.
AT EN LP EI
Including CoL (Bytes) 2193 1928 1056 1912
Excluding CoL (Bytes) 1041 1928 1056 1912
We proposed a CoL that enables the users to anonymously verify the location of the parties involved
in energy trading. CoL enhances the anonymity level of users and thus protects user privacy. On the flip
side, it increases the processing overhead on the users to generate and verify CoL. To evaluate the incurred
overhead, we implemented our framework using Java programming language on Raspberry Pi 2, which
represents low-resource devices. We measured the processing time for generating the CoL request, which
involves generating a set of keys and forming the Merkle tree, and verifying the CoL, which involves verifying
the existence of the PK in the Merkle tree and validating the corresponding signatures. The implementation
results are shown in Table 4. The verification of the CoL involves verifying two signatures, which potentially
takes longer time than generating CoL. In addition to the processing overhead, CoL increases the size of the
transactions. Table 5 compares the size of transactions and shows that CoL only affects the AT. It nearly
doubles the size of AT, but this does not affect the size of the blockchain as AT’s are stored off-chain only.
All other transactions are unaffected by CoL.
6. Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security and privacy of the proposed framework. We first outline threat
mode and then discuss possible attacks and how to protect against those.
Threat Model: We assume that the adversary (or cooperative adversaries) can sniff the communications,
discard transactions, generate fake transactions, and pretend to be another node in the network. The
adversary may attempt to deanonymize a user by classifying blockchain transactions and monitoring real-
time communications in blockchain. We assume standard secure encryption algorithms are in place, which
cannot be compromised by the adversary. We assume smart meters are tamper resistance, and thus the end
users cannot modify the transactions generated by the meters.
6.1. Security
In the following, we discuss possible attacks and how the proposed framework protects against those.
CoL Reply Attack: In this attack, the malicious node attempts to employ CoL of another node to
generate transactions. The node that employs a CoL is required to sign the corresponding transaction with
the private key corresponding to a PK that exists in MTR that is only known to the CoL generator. Thus,
it is impossible for a malicious node to utilize the CoL of another node.
Fake CoL: In this attack, a malicious node pretends to be a genuine smart meter generates fake CoL
that can later be used in its energy tradings. The CoL must be signed only by a genuine smart meter, and
the CA validates the PK of the verifier. In the case of this attack, CA will not validate PK, and thus the
attack can be detected.
Double selling: In this attack, a malicious energy producer attempts to sell the same amount of energy
to different consumers. Recall from Section 4 that an energy trade involves three main transactions, which
are EN, LP, and EI. Once the agreed energy is injected to the grid, the smart meter of the energy producer
generates a EI transaction that triggers the payment of the energy price to the producer. The smart meter
generates only one EI that includes a reference to the corresponding LP, and LP includes a reference to the
corresponding EN. Thus, it is impossible for the energy producer to sell the same energy to multiple nodes.
An energy producer may attempt to inject less energy than the agreed amount and claim the full price.
The smart meter of the producer will only generate the EI if the full amount of agreed energy is injected to
16
the grid. If the energy producer injects part of the energy and the expiry time approaches, the smart meter
will generate an EI reflecting the amount that is injected to the grid. In this case, DR smart contract is
called that adjusts the price of the energy and ensues the producer is only paid for the amount of energy
injected to the grid.
Reputation Modification: In this attack, the malicious node attempts to improve their reputation or
reduce the reputation of another node in the network. Recall that blockchain is an immutable ledger that
makes it impossible to modify or remove previously stored transactions, which makes it impossible for the
attacker to modify their reputation. To reduce the reputation of another node, the malicious node shall
modify the code of the smart contract, which is impossible due to the immutability of the blockchain. DR
smart contract is the only entity that can reduce the reputation of a node. All participants know the address
of the valid DR contract. When participating nodes receive reputation reduction from a contract, they first
verify if the contract address matches with the genuine DR smart contract. If so, they accept the new
reputation. Otherwise, they discard the transaction.
6.2. Privacy
In the following, we analyze the proposed framework from the privacy perspective. Recall from Section
4 that the grid operator charges a grid service charge per each transaction that depends on the distance
between the energy consumer and producer. Thus, the consumer and producer must prove their location,
however, this may compromise their privacy as malicious nodes can classify the blockchain transactions
to deanonymize the user. To address this challenge, we proposed A-PoL that enables the participants in
the blockchain to verify the location of an anonymous smart meter using a CoL. Assume node A is using
A-PoL. The privacy of A can be studied from the perspective of the following entities: i) CA: A uses the
PK populated by the CA only to prove its identity to the verifier. CoL employed by A includes PK of the
verifier and not A. Given that the verifier is selected randomly by A and there is no link between A and
the verifier, the CA is unable to identify the transactions generated by A, ii) verifier: A only sends MTR to
the verifier that hides the actual PKs of A from the verifier. A reveals the PKs in the Merkle tree to prove
ownership of CoL. A group of smart meters may choose to create a single MTR, which further protects their
privacy, and iii) network participants: the network participants only receive CoL that contains of the verifier
and MTR. As outlined earlier, there is no link between the verifier and A, thus knowledge of the identity of
the verifier does not impact the privacy of A. The Merkle tree includes a number of PKs that are employed
by A (or other involved smart meters) to generate transactions, thus, A may generate multiple transactions
with the same PK. This potentially reduces the anonymity level of the user as malicious nodes may attempt
to deanonymize a user by classifying their transactions. The anonymity level of A largely depends on the
number of PKs employed in the Merkle tree. The large number of PKs incur overheads on A to manage the
keys. Thus, there is a trade-off between the number of keys in the Merkle tree and user anonymity.
Recall from Section 3.2 that the energy producer and consumer employ a cost/utility function, as shown
in (6) and (7), which represent their willingness to pay or accept energy price based on their preferences and
concerns. These functions depend on ai, bi, and ci, and thus it is critical for the producers and consumers
to keep these values private. In the proposed framework, the market settlement does not need the nodes to
reveal ai, bi and ci, which in turn enhances the privacy of the users.
7. Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-enabled P2P energy market, which provides a secure and privacy-
preserving environment for energy trading between producers and consumers. A decentralized market set-
tlement process is designed, which allows agents to trade energy without revealing their private information.
The grid service charge, calculated based on the distance between producer and consumer, is used to incite
agents trade energy locally and to reduce the possibility of overloading electricity grid lines.
To reduce the blockchain memory footprint, we propose AD that stores the energy advertisements and
is maintained by the grid operator. A prioritization step is implemented to enable agents to select their
trading partners based on their location and reputation factors. In order to allow agents to prove their
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location without revealing their real identity, an A-PoL algorithm is proposed using CoL issued by smart
meters. Simulation results on IEEE 33-bus test system confirm that the proposed framework improves the
welfare of agents through P2P trading, while their privacy is protected. Furthermore, employing AD to store
ATs, and limiting the number of trading partners through prioritization decrease the system overheads.
For future work is needed to relax the tamper resistance assumption considered for smart meters. Re-
laxing this assumption complicates the trust issue as the smart meters may generate fake transactions. As
another research direction, the impact of mobility of the smart meters on A-PoL can be studied. In such
cases, the CA must ensure that the location of a meter is as claimed before granting a certificate. It is
critical for the CA to be able to revoke granted certificates as smart meters may change its location. An-
other challenge for future work is to explore ways of decentralizing the AD without increasing the blockchain
memory footprint to achieve an even more decentralized energy marketplace.
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